WILLIAM H. OAKLAND* fiscal equalization is the process through which a central government makes funds available to lower level governments with the objective of reducing the degree of inequality in the revenues that such governments can raise using their own revenue instruments.' While the proximate objective is concerned with revenues, the ultimate objective may be to reduce inequalities in public expenditure.2 Equalization policies have been advocated on both efficiency and equity grounds. In this essay, we shall critically examine these arguments and demonstrate that the case for equalization is weaker than generally thought. Nevertheless, a case can be made for a policy which is directed to assist those governments with constituencies which are disproportionately poor. While such a policy could be labeled as equalization, it may more properly be viewed as an extension of the logic of centralizing the costs of income redistribution in a federal system.
FISCAL DISPARITIES
The flip side of equalization is the concept of fiscal disparities--i.e., those differences that equalization is supposed to remove.3 We begin the discussion, *Tulane Umversity, New Orleans, LA 701 18. therefore, by identifying alternative measures of fiscal disparities that have been discussed in the literature.
In the broadest sense, fiscal disparities can be defined as differences in fiscal effort required to achieve a particular fiscal outcome. Some authors have been content to define outcomes in terms of revenues, while others have been more ambitious, measuring fiscal outcomes in terms of levels of public services.4 Some even propose to measure outcomes in terms of achievement of certain standards, such as test scores or levels of public safety. Such distinctions are clearly important, affecting both the scope and character of an equalization program; hence, they will be given separate treatment below.
Similarly, the concept of fiscal effort is central to our concerns. Two principal candidates have been suggested. One measures fiscal effort in terms of tax rates, while the other measures effort in terms of the fraction of income of resident taxpayers surrendered in the process. The first approach has most commonly been identified with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), which has developed the concept of the Representative Revenue Structure (RRS).5 Simply put, the RRS is a vector of the average effective tax rates on all tax bases in use. The ACIR uses the RRS to construct an index of fiscal capacity, defined as the ratio of the revenues that a jurisdiction would collect if tt were to impose RRS tax rates to what the average lurisdiction would collect using the same tax r,ates. The inverse of the fiscal capacity index represents the surcharge on average tax rates necessary to collect the average revenue.
The income burden approach to fiscal effort has been aclvocated by Yinger (1986) and Ladd aind Yinger (1989) , among others. This concept is more transparent than the RRS measure. However, its implementation may be much more controversial because of uncertainties about the ultirnate incidence of many taxes, especially with respect to tax exporting and importing. Consequently, the data requiirements for it are an order of magnitude greater than for the RRS.
Clearly, the two approaches to fiscal effort are closely relisted. Indeed, if income were the only tax base, they would be identical. But, in the United States, property taxes dominate many local revenue structures aind sales taxes are the major tax source of state governments.
Moreover, when rnore than one tax base is employed, the measures may diverge. Among other things, different taxes can afford different possibilities for shifting to nonresidents. Alternatively, there could be differences in proportions of nonexported taxes6
While the income burden approach is more relevant to issues of tax incidence, the tax rate appro(ach is more germane for issues relating to tax base mobility. Equalization policy may thus be directed to either or both rneasures of disparity.
EQUITY
As with most public policy initiatives, equalization of fiscal disparities has been defended on both efficiency and equity grounds. Similarly, the same considerused by critics of ations have also been equalization policy.
Horizontal Equity
An equity case for equalization has been advanced by Yinger (1986) , who proposed the principle of "Fair Compensation." This principle states that the average tax burden, relative to income, required for the standard bundle of public services should not depend upon one's community of residence. This can be interpreted as an application of horizontal equityq7 It is also similar to a positron advanced by James Buchanan (1950) nearly a half century ago in his classic paper, "Federalism and Fiscal Equity." There, he advocated the equalization of taxpayer surplus among communities, where surplus measures the differences between benefits from public services and taxes paid for such services.8
At first blush, Fair Compensation has intuitive appeal. It seems to be a straightforward application of an important canon of income taxation--i.e., individuals with like income should pay like taxes. However, when extended to the finance of local government services, it acquires an added dimension, because it tacitly implies that the price of public services should be income dependent. In effect, all Income classes would surrender the same fraction of their income for the standard bundle of services. Consequently, Fair Compensation can also be seen to have an important dimension of vertical equity.
However, the relation of Fair Compensation to vertical equity is markedly incomplete. Why should lequalization be limited to public consumption?
Are Alternatively, one might defend the limitation on the grounds that publicly provided services are so unique and basic to life that they should be provided on an egalitarian basis. However, with the possible exception of elementary and secondary education and some minimum level of law and order, locally provided public services are not fundamentally more important than the goods provided in the private sector. Arguably, food is more basic than garbage collection, clothing is more essential than recreation, and outlays for health are more important than public transportation.g Moreover, real decisions are at the margin, and what is true for a category as a whole may not be true for increments in that category. There is no evidence that marginal outlays for public services, even on education, are more important than marginal outlays on other private goods. In short, the burden of proof remains with those who argue for the primacy of public services.
Vertical Equity
If the major source of disparities is caused by differences of income distribution among communities, one might defend equalization on income redistribution grounds. Holding expenditure levels constant, taxes as a fraction of income will tend be lower in those communities with above average income and vice versa. Hence, a policy which equalizes the costs of public services would redistribute income from "rich" communities to "poor" communities.
Clearly, such an approach is a clumsy means for achieving vertical equity. For one thing, other factors, such as the ability to export taxes to nonresidents, will influence the burden a community actually faces. For another, communities are seldom homogeneous with respect to income. There is no guarantee that equalization funds would be spent for the benefit of the poor residents of a community. Indeed, to the extent that such funds reduce tax rates, benefits will redound to the relatively affluent within the community. Even if the funds are spent directly on behalf of the poor, the benefits may be captured by others. For example, housing subsidies for poor households may end up simply raising rents, with no increase in the consumer surplus from housing services. While the latter is admittedly an extreme example, it points to the difficulty in targeting public programs. For the case at hand, the benefits of equalization grants will almost certainly accrue to the rich as well as to poor residents of recipient communities. Thus, if the primary objective of equalization is to reduce interpersonal income disparities, it would be dominated by a policy which provides direct grants to poor individuals.
Equality of Opportunity
While it may be difficult to construct a general case for equalization on equity grounds, it may be possible to do so for particular goods and services such as public elementary and secondary education. In recent years, courts have increasingly rejected financing arrangements which afford affluent communities unlimited ability to exercise their superior economic resources with respect to public schooling. Even before court activism, however, equalization schemes at the state level were widespread. Apparently, the underlying motives are equality of opportunity and increasing social and economic mobility However, it has become increasingly clear that even complete equalization is not sufficient to guarantee equality of educational outcome, or even to guarantee equality of public: resources.'o This seems to have prompted some courts to require total state financing of public education." However, even such a sweeping reform may not succeed if affluent families opt out of the public c:bduc:ation system.12 Property Ri!gh ts Lastly, an equity case might be advanced for the sharing of the bounty provided by natural resouroes. Not all regions are equally blessed with natural resources such as mineral deposits, proximity to cheap transportation and/or power, and climatic advantages. Through tax and regulatory policies,, communities are frequently able to tap these resources, providing a windfall to community residents through superior public services and/or lower local taxes.'" A case may well be made for the sharing of such windfalls among a wider polity than the jurisdiction in which the resource is physically located.14 Equalization grants rnay be one means for achieving such an objective. It should be emphasized, however, that the fundamental equity issue here is one of property rights. Whether resource wealth should be considered as a local, state, or national resource involves complex issues and its resolution may well rest upon the principle of "right is might" rather than moral principles. Nevertheless, as we shall argue below, considerations of economic efficiency may also provide s#upport for such policies.
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
In a world of mobile tax bases, interjurisdictional tax differlentials can influence the location of such tax bases. Communities which can afford lower tax rates can attract a greater share of business activity and other tax bases. To the extent thal higher tax rates do not reflect higher costs of doing business, relocations based on tax Idifferentials' are often socially wasteful. Similarly, the fear of losing tax base may discourage communities from undertaking productive public: expenditure. Since the loss (gain) of tax base involves a gain (loss) to some other tax jurisdiction, there is no aggregate welfare loss associated with relocations caused by increased expenditures. Hence, the gain or loss of tax base should not be considered in deciding how much to spend in the pulblic sector. Narrowing of tax rate and/or 'tax burden differentials via equalization would ameliorate both of these apparent distortions.
However, the process of equalization may actually introduce distortions of its own. In particular, (disparities of tax burden may be necessary to achieve an efficient articulation of taxpayers' demands for public services. Moreover, equalizatlon may discourage efficient reallocation of population and economic activity among jurisdictions. In effect, it would prop up inefficient entities. The latter consideratron induced Buchanan to recant his advocacy fIor the equalization of taxpayer surpluses."
He pointed to the need to maximize the sum of public and private output, which would generally call for taxpayer surplus to differ among jurisdicti 3ns.
Like most controversies, there is merit to both sides of the argument. The efficiency consequences of equalization depends upon the underlying source of the disparitres. A discussion of this issue follows.
SOURCES OF FISCAL. DISPARITY Income Distribution
A major source of fiscal disparity arises from asymmetries in income distribution.
Simply put, the higher the average income, caeteris paribus, the lower the tax effort required per unit of public services. Hence, the effort required for the "standard package" of services would be negatively correlated with income. However, such variations are not necessarily symptoms of resource misallocation. Indeed, they may signal just the opposite. The sorting of people into communities with different income characteristics may be a manifestation of the Tiebout mechanism, where people "vote with their feet." Because the demand for most public services is income elastic, income heterogeneous communities are likely to provide a fiscal outcome not favored by any class.
If local taxes were levied on a benefit basis, such as through head taxes or user fees, people would tend naturally to sort themselves into homogeneous communities.16 There is no reason to presume that the actual tax effort expended would be constant across communities. Nevertheless, with benefit taxation, there would be no fiscal incentive for households to change communities." A policy of equalization in such an environment might distort the true cost of public services in all communities. In "poor" communities, public services might appear artificially cheap, since part of their costs would be covered by grants, with the opposite effect in affluent communities.18
Thus, rather than being supportive of equalization, efficiency considerations weigh against the use of intergovernmental grants that narrow fiscal disparities arising from interjurisdictional income differentials. Such efficiency losses should be offset against any alleged equity gains.
Cost Differentials
In recent years it has become increasingly fashionable to measure fiscal disparity inclusive of interjurisdictional cost differentials.lg Such variation can arise from two main sources: (1) differences in factor input costs and (2) differences in the effectiveness of public inputs in producing public output.
From the standpoint of efficiency, the equalization of factor price differences is of dubious merit. Presumably, such prices measure the opportunity costs of that factor; to subsidize the costs of inputs used in the provision of public services would make such services appear artificially cheap relative to private goods and services. Moreover, it would also lead to excessive relative use of the factors being subsidized. A further inefficiency arises as people are encouraged to locate in high cost areas.
Even if one ignored these efficiency consequences, focusing only on equity arguments, equalization of factor cost differentials may be totally unwarranted. Wage premia often arise to compensate for locational disadvantages such as disamenities or higher cost of living. To equalize for these premia would be to doubly compensate individuals for disamenities.
Similar remarks would apply to differences in the productivity of public inputs. The fact that public transit is more expensive in a hilly environment is a feature of the economic map. To erase this feature through equalization is to encourage excessive populations in such areas. It would be analogous to equalizing the cost of home heating between Alaska and southern California. To erase such distinctions is simply bad regional policy.
More troublesome, however, are differences in productivity arising from the characteristics of the populations being served." It is more expensive to provide public safety in inner city ghettos than in middle class suburbs. If such costs were equalized, ii: is not clear that people would flock to the ghettos in response." Lil<e physical handicaps, it may be deemed equitable to provide compensating assistance. However, unlike physical handicaps, the need arises from behavior which, ait least to some measure, may be subject to the control of those being assisted. Most important, however, may be limitations arising from the inability to accurately measure such handicaps. Presenit methods utilizing multiple regressioryl analysis of actual spending behavior have serious methodological shortcomings.
By hypothesis, spending is not a ,valid measure of output. Hence, the coefficients produced by spending studies measure handicap only if actual budget policy compensates exactly for the handicap--a highly tenuous, condition.
Natural Resource Differentials
Not only do disparities in regional natural resource endowments raise issues of equity, but they are likely to be a source of spatial misallocation of mobile resources, particularly labor resources. The problem is a result of the freedom people have to move among jurisdictions, and the fact that, for the most part, new residents must be given the same treatment by the local fist as existing residents. The immobility of natural resources make thern vulnerable to exploitation by local governrnent taxation, providing revenue windfallIs to area residents. Tlogether these considerations give rise to a "problem of the commons." That is, new residents will be drawn to resource rich communities to share in the fiscal benefits provided by such resources.22 From a spatial efficiency perspective, there will be too many people in resource rich communities and too few in resource poor regions.'" In principle, a policy of equalization would eliminate the fiscal benefits of superior natural resourc:e endowments. In effect, the central government nationalizes the fiscal benefits of natural resources. However, the real issue here is one of implementability.
How can we distinguish the nature and extent of local fiscal benefits made available by superior ndtural resourc:es?
If the natural resource is owned directly by the local jurisdiction, one can directly observe its fiscal benefits. This would be the case of mineral royalties on state owned land. However, such instances are the exception rather than the rule. For the most part, ownership of the resource is either vested with private owners or, as in the case of environmental amenities, owned by no one. In such circ:umstances, it may be very drfficult, if not impossible, to measure accurately the fiscal benefits of the resource. Consider taxes upon privately held mineral resources. Almost certainly, some part of such taxes' will be shifted away from resource owners to others, such as workers. Here, the tax proceeds would overstate the community benefit."" Even more troublesome are those resources in the common domain. Here, to enjoy the benefit of the resource requires access. This suggests that much of the net benefit Iof the resource will be embedded in land prices. Communities can thus collectivize portions of the resource through property taxation. Only is portion of the property tax proceeds, however, will be reflective of resource rents; the remaining will be attributable to capital investment. To separate these two elements will be difficult at best. Property t'axes, hovvever, are not the only tool the community can 'use to capture resource rents. Similar WSUltS can be obtained through the taxation of products which utilize the resource as an input, as in the tourist industry. Here also, tax proceeds would be an imper-feet indicator of community fiscal benefit.
Further measurement issues arise if the community were to enjoy monopoly power for some goods which it exports to nonresidents. This may itself be the result of a unique natural resource or of exogenous government policy, such as identifying an area as a government center. In such circumstances, by judicious taxation of the monopolized commodity, the community may extract a still larger fiscal windfall than the resource itself would permit.*' Just how a central government should measure such monopoly power in practice is problematic at best.
While the preceding focus has been upon measurement of the income burden of resource taxation, similar issues arise for the RRS approach taken by the ACIR. While it may be the case that tax bases of all types will be enhanced by the existence of superior resources, the connection is very loose. Enlarged tax bases will also accrue to those communities which trade off environmental amenities for the tax and employment benefits of industry. It is unlikely that even the most sophisticated determinants of location study could disentangle resource and environmental induced industry.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY Wither Equalization
Aid?
Our analysis suggests that there can be both equity and efficiency justifications for a policy of equalization. The strongest equity case involves the reduction of disparities of educational opportunity so as to foster social and economic mobility. Fairness also dictates the equalization of the costs of compensatory services arising from inherent citizen attributes. A third, but less compelling, motive is to share natural resource wealth among the polity as a whole. On the negative side of the ledger, equalization is not properly suited to resolve problems of vertical equity. Also not persuasive is the position that differential income burdens imposed by a standard bundle of public services should be eliminated. Finally, we have the issues of feasibility. Equalization aid is an unwieldy instrument to equalize fiscal outcomes. Our experience with public school aid suggests that even the most aggressive equalization will allow considerable disparity to remain. As for compensatory services, measurement errors bedevil policy formulation.
On the efficiency side, the case is much weaker. Indeed, the equalization of disparities arising from income distribution or costs may have negative consequences for economic efficiency. Only when disparities arise from differences in natural resource endowment can equalization improve resource allocation. However, there are serious weaknesses in our ability to identify such resource endowments.
These considerations suggest that equalization efforts should be carefully tailored to the objective being sought. If the objective is equality of educational opportunity, the focus should be upon outcomes rather than the burden that would be hypothetically imposed if a standard bundle of educational services were purchased. On the other hand, if the objective is to narrow disparities arising from natural resources, the focus should not be upon broad measures of burden which are influenced by income distribution and/or input cost differentials.
Moreover, the difficulty in quantifying local natural resource wealth may dictate that the central government tax goods complementary with that resource, using the proceeds to finance its own services.26 Finally, If the objective is to level the playing field for "disadvantaged" citizens, policies should be targeted with regard to the number Iof such disadvantaged and research should be focused on identifying the consequences of the disadvantage.
In none of the aforementioned cases is there a use for broad measures of fiscal disadvantage as advanced by Ladd and Yinger (198'9) or by the ACIR. By design, both measures incorporate the effect of disparities ansing from1 income distribution and both are subject to serious measurement errors. The Ladd-Yinger measure requires the estimation of tax exporting and importing, for which we currently have little empirical basis. The ACIR approach, by contrast, is based upon the assumption that the existence of a tax base impllies taxable capacity, whether or not the tax is exported or borne by local residents. Moreover, if a community trades environmental quality for an industrial tax base, this will increase its taxable capacity and decrease its equalization aid.
A major impetus for equalization aid has been the fiscal plkght of major United States central cities. Almost without exception, the cities are facing a chronic fiscal crisis. Much of the responsibility for this crisis is attribuitable to the concentration of poor households within the boundaries of the central city. Obviously, poor households contribute little to the tax base, and major concentrations of the poor are known to increase the need for public services. Historically, the central city has had a superior resource base with vvhich to offset thts disadvantage. However, the last generation has seen a marked decrease in this comparative advantage. Hence, the belief is that equalization aid, particularly that which takes into account the extra public service needs of the central city, would help ease the fiscal plight of the city As with other objec:tives, however, equalizaiion may not be the olptimal tool with which to address the prolblem of the central city. It would make far more sense to confront the problem directly by targeting aid to the poor. That the federal government is the applropriate agency to conduct income redistribution is generally conceded. In practice, an overwhelming share of the "safety-net" system is funded at the federal level. Curiously, however, this effort has stopped ai providing for the private consumption of the poor. In fact, however, the poor are major consumers of local public goods and services. Given that most tales are driven by income, however, thci poor do not fully pay for the public services they consume. The balance is rnade up through taxes on other taxpayers. As menttoned, historically, the central city was the seat of much of the resource rents within the urban area. This enablled it to rnaintain services without puttinlg an undue burden on mobile tax bases, such as affluent households and business capitalI. The rapid increase in the share of the city's population which is poor and the erosion of resource rents has translated into higher taxes for rnobile taxpayers ancl/or substandard services. Both of these have lead to fulrther outmigration of mobile tax bases. This cumulative deterioration of the central city could be anneliorated or even reversed if the federal governrnent wouild follow its own logic with regard to the safety-net systern and extend its support to the public good consumption of the urban poor. The costs of such a program would be relatively modest, amounting to but a small fraction of the current welfare system. Moreover, It woulol be relatively easy to implement. All that would be required is 2Ch National Tax Journal Vol. 47, no. 1, (March, 1994), pp. 199-209 an estimate of the cost of the safety-net level of public services to be supported and an identification of the size of the group to be served. In the aggregate, the effect of such a program would appear to be equalizing by conventional measures. However, at the individual city level, the extent of effective equalization would likely show great variability. The latter would be a reflection of how an equalization approach would fail to meet an identified social need.
Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, the case for fiscal equalization is far less persuasive than commonly thought. As a means of addressing inequities it is poorly targeted and often seems based on a dubious primacy of public goods and services. It is also clumsy as a means of equalizing regional disparities in resource endowments, which may give rise to both inequities and inefficiencies. These advantages are manifested in numerous and often subtle ways, not subject to accurate measurement. They are also difficult to disentangle from revenue disparities arising from income differentials, which are not suitable objects of equalization.
Lastly, there is potential for considerable mischief in the extension of equalization to cover cost disparities in the provision of public services, as is espoused by the other authors in this symposium. With few exceptions, to equalize cost disparities is tantamount to repealing the reality of the economic map and would encourage wasteful location decisions.
While the objectives sought by those advocating equalization policies are often noble ones, they can usually be accomplished more effectively by policies which more carefully target the problem at hand. Pearce, MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics (1992, p. 129) . This clearly seems to be the focus of the other two papers in this symposium.
However, revenue disparities remain the root of the Issue. This section draws heavily from Oakland (1994).
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1971) is most readily identified with the revenue approach.
More recently, this approach was adopted by Bahl et al. (1992) . Cost adjusted disparities have been proposed by Bradbury et al. (1984) . See the ACIR's Measuring the Fiscal Capacity and Effort of State Local Areas (1971 and subsequent periodic updates). The differences between the two measures is dealt with in detail in Oakland (1994) . Since it applies only to the average burden, however, it may fail to equalize the burden for all citizen-taxpayers.
This would be the case, for example, if the tax burden of local taxes is not proportional to income. For example, if tax burdens are regressive, equalizing average tax burdens would result in higher tax burdens on those well-to-do taxpayers residing in "rich" communities than in "poor" communities. However, Buchanan has since recanted this position. See Buchanan and Wagner (1970) . While it is the case that we sometimes observe public intervention into individual choices of private goods, e.g., food stamps and public housing, these programs effectively provide fungible resources which do not restrict individual choices. Among the first to make this argument was Feldstein (1975) .
Complete state financing is not necessary to have the same effect. A similar result could be obtained by requiring local governments to contribute money to the equalization fund and placing a cap on the money any local government can spend. This is the policy adopted by California. Downes and Schoeman (1992) 
